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Reference source
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Cryptographic Agility: Securing the Salesforce Ecosystem Against the Quantum Threat

Salesforce's own PQC readiness white paper — current platform crypto posture and the customer-side hardening it recommends.

Jurisdiction
INTL
Document version
2026-03-18
Last reviewed
2026-11-17
Update cadence
quarterly
Mapped section
Salesforce's Quantum Protection Strategy
Canonical URL
https://compliance.salesforce.com/en/documents/a00Kd00000z7HMjIAM

Machine-readable mapping points

no-pqc-in-core-yet · Salesforce has not announced NIST PQC algorithms in its core services Used to caveat TLS findings — a hybrid-capable partner endpoint does not mean Salesforce callouts negotiate ML-KEM.
retire-rsa-key-exchange · Move away from RSA key exchange; adopt TLS 1.3 with forward secrecy Cited by the static-RSA key-exchange and TLS 1.2 probe findings.
key-rotation · Regularly rotate and test rotation of encryption keys Cited by the Shield tenant-secret rotation finding.

Vendor guidance, not a regulation. Salesforce states that data at rest is protected with AES-256 (considered quantum-resistant), that it supports TLS 1.2 and 1.3 with perfect-forward-secrecy cipher suites, and that it has not yet publicly announced ML-KEM or ML-DSA in its core services.

For customers it recommends retiring static RSA key exchange, adopting TLS 1.3 for integrations, using strong key lengths, and practising key rotation. QuantumShield cites it where a finding repeats Salesforce’s own advice, and to explain why Salesforce-side callouts should still be treated as classical key establishment.